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JURISDICTIONAL QUAGMIRE: THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF K-MART CORP. v. CARTIER 
Giovanna M. Cinelli* 
The Supreme Court's decisions in K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 
Inc. 1 represent an important step in deciding at least two critical 
issues in the field of international trade. First, the Court defined 
when jurisdiction in certain matters of international trade vests 
more appropriately in the Court of International Trade [CIT] 
rather than in the regional district courts.2 At stake is the interpre-
tation of statutory authority, 28 U.S.C. § 1581, and the reevalua-
tion of a need for specialized knowledge in the area of interna-
tional trade. 
The second issue, decided by the Court in K-Mart Corp. v. 
Cartier, Inc. 3 but not the subject of this article, was the validity of 
the United States Customs regulations promulgated to implement 
19 U.S.C. § 1526(a). In holding the regulations invalid, the Court 
established the limits to the deference owed an executive agency 
that develops regulations interpreting statutory language." 
The overall importance of the Supreme Court's K-Mart I deci-
sion cannot be underestimated since the question of jurisdiction 
remains prevalent in the minds of every litigator and the Supreme 
Court. The need to resolve intercircuit conflicts, sometimes over 
jurisdiction, manifests itself in practically every Supreme Court 
session.5 
* Associate, Howrey & Simon, Washington, D.C. Formerly the Judicial Clerk to the 
Honorable Philip Nichols, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and 
the Honorable Steff en W. Graae, D.C. Superior Court. 
1. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. [K-Mart I], 108 S. Ct. 950 (1988). 
2. Id. at 958-60. 
3. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. [K-Mart II], 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988). 
4. Id. Several commentators have reviewed the impact the K-Mart II decision will have 
on future development of regulations in the international trade area. See, e.g., Comment, 
The Gray Market Controversy and the Court: An Analysis of Confiicting Court of Appeals 
Decisions on the Validity of Customs Regulations Permitting Unauthorized Third Party 
Importation of Trademarked Goods, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 55, 63-64 (1988). Commenta-
tors speculated prior to the Supreme Court's decision that the conflict between the D. C. 
and Federal Circuits indicated the need for the Supreme Court to dispose of the question of 
the § 526 regulations validity. Id. See also Note, The Greying of American Trademarks: 
The Genuine Goods Exclusion Act and the Incongruity of Customs Regulation 19 C.F.R. § 
133.21, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 83 (1985); Takamatsu, Parallel Importation of Trademarked 
Goods: A Comparative Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV. 433 (1982). That speculation was obvi-
ously valid. 
5. The Supreme Court grants certiorari in those cases evidencing conflicts between the 
circuits. See, e.g., H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988); United 
1
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In the K-Mart I case, the Supreme Court has focused its at-
tention on the issue of the appropriate jurisdictional forum when 
specialized knowledge or expertise is involved. In early 1985, the 
identical substantive issues raised in K-Mart I were litigated 
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
in Vivitar Corp. v. United States,6 a case in which the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari7 most likely on the grounds that no circuit 
conflict existed regarding the substantive or jurisdictional issues 
raised. It was not until late 1986, when the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals contested the jurisdictional · interpretation 
of the Federal Circuit in Vivitar, that conflicts arose. 
The scope of this article extends solely to reviewing the press-
ing question of proper jurisdiction as between the CIT and the dis-
trict courts regarding issues of international trade. 8 Part I will fo-
cus on the question of CIT jurisdiction in general. Congress 
expressed an intent that particular issues requiring skill and exper-
tise in the area of international trade be especially handled by the 
CIT in order to preserve or create consistency and to prevent fo-
rum shopping.9 But what the limits of this consistency are when 
juxtaposed against federal question jurisdiction remains open and 
unanswered. 
Part II analyzes CIT and district court case law construing § 
1581(i). While the superficial legal interpretation of the jurisdic-
tional statutes appears consistent, a divergence occurs in the appli-
States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64 (1987); Acosti v. Louisiana Dept. of Health & Human Re-
sources, 478 U.S. 251, 253 (1986) ("Because such a direct conflict over the interpretation of 
the Rules of Appellate Procedure calls for resolution in this Court, we grant the petition for 
a writ of certiorari"); Texas Ass'n of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. United States, 476 U.S. 
1151, 1153 (1986) (certiorari was denied, but Justices White and Brennan dissented, noting 
the direct conflict between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits requires resolution by the Supreme 
Court). 
6. 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986). 
7. 474 U.S. 1055 (1986). 
8. 28 u.s.c. § 1581 (1982). 
9. Note that the same concern for continuity and consistency exists in the area of pat-
ent law and remains one of the major policy reasons for the formation of the Federal Cir-
cuit. As the Senate report for the Judiciary Committee so aptly points out: 
[The purposes of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 include filling] the 
void in the judicial systen by creating an appellate forum capable of exercising na-
tionwide jurisdiction over appeals in areas of the law where Congress determines 
there is a special need for nationwide uniformity, to improve the administration of 
the patent law by centralizing appeals in patent cases, and to provide an upgraded 
and better organized trial forum for government claims cases. 
S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d sess. 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 11, 12; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1987 Supp.). 
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cation of the statute to the particular facts of the cases in question. 
Some courts conclude that the statute requires cases to be heard 
originally by the CIT when the issues at hand primarily involve the 
"regulation of international trade in goods bearing genuine trade-
marks. "10 Other courts focus on the fact that district courts main-
tain subject matter jurisdiction over issues involving international 
trade because it is a species of federal question.11 Part III then 
analyzes the inter-relationships between existing lower court cases. 
Part IV discusses the Supreme Court's decision in K-Mart I. 
Hinging its opinion on the definition of "embargo," the Supreme 
Court's majority held that the subject matter of the K-Mart I case 
did not fall squarely within the limits of 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(l), and 
as such, the CIT lacked exclusive jurisdiction both under subsec-
tion (i)(l), and the residual clause, § 1581(i)(4). 
The language of the K-Mart I decision undermines the ex-
press Congressional intent of§ 1581(i). Although the terms of sub-
section (i) are not defined within the statute itself, statutory 
sources exist to provide courts with the proper focus to define 
terms such as "duties," "tariffs," "embargoes" or "quantitative re-
strictions." As Justice Scalia, the dissenting author notes, several 
logistical problems exist with the majority's restrictive view of the 
term, "embargo." The minority concludes that the foundation for 
such a narrowing rests on tenuous grounds. In concurrence with 
Scalia's dissent, this author finds such a tenuous definition is im-
provident, especially in light of Congress' express attempt to con-
solidate similar questions of international trade in one forum. 
Part V concludes that the Supreme Court's restrictive inter-
pretation has far-reaching ramifications, not the least of which is 
forum shopping in light of the CIT's and district courts' shared 
jurisdiction. The uncertainty this may cause both in interpreting 
future statutory jurisdictional provisions and the impact on the 
business community's continued functioning in international mar-
kets has yet to be established. But the import will be great as the 
Court has succeeded in setting a restrictive example of statutory 
construction in matters relating to the CIT. In this author's opin-
ion, the prudence of this view will be tested often. 
10. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 1419, 1423 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984); see 
infra notes 67 to 79 and accompanying text. 
11. See, e.g., Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. 
United States, 598 F. Supp. 844, 847 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 790 F.2d 903 
(D.C. Cir. 1986). 
3
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I. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
The Court of International Trade derives its jurisdiction from 
Chapter 95 of Title 28 in the United States Code. Section 158112 
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1581. Civil actions against the United States and agencies and officers 
thereof. 
(a) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any 
civil action commenced to contest the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under 
section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 
(b) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any 
civil action commenced under section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 
(c) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any 
civil action commenced under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930. 
(d) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any 
civil action commenced to review: 
(1) any final determination of the Secretary of Labor under section 223 of the Trade 
Act of 1974 with respect to the eligibility of workers for adjustment assistance 
under such Act; 
(2) any final determination of the Secretary of Commerce under section 251 of the 
Trade Act of 197 4 with respect to the eligibility of a firm for adjustment assistance 
under such Act; and 
(3) any final determination of the Secretary of Commerce under section 271 of the 
Trade Act of 197 4 with respect to the eligibility of a community for adjustment 
assistance under such Act. 
(e) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any 
civil action commenced to review any final determination of the Secretary of the 
Treasury under section 305(b)(l) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. 
(f) The Court of International Trade shall have · exclusive jurisdiction of any 
civil action involving an application for an order directing the administering author-
ity or the International Trade Commission to make confidential information availa-
ble under section 777(c)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930. 
(g) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any 
civil action commenced to review: 
(1) any decision of the Secretary of the Treasury to deny a customs broker's license 
under section 641(b)(2) or (3) of the Tariff Act of 1930, or to deny a customs bro-
ker's permit under section 641(c)(l) of such Act, or to revoke a license or permit 
under section 641(b)(5) or (c)(2) of such Act; and (2) any decision of the Secretary 
of the Treasury to revoke or suspend a customs broker's license or permit, or im-
pose a monetary penalty in lieu thereof, under section 641(d)(2)(B) of the Tariff Act 
of 1930. 
(h) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any 
civil action commenced to review, prior to the importation of the goods involved, a 
ruling issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, or a refusal to issue or change such a 
ruling, relating to classification, valuation, rate of duty, marking, restricted mer-
chandise, entry requirements, drawbacks, vessel repairs, or similar matters, but only 
if the party commencing the civil action demonstrates to the court that he would be 
irreparably harmed unless given an opportunity to obtain judicial review prior to 
such importation. 
(i) In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of International 
Trade by subsections (a)-(h) of this section and subject to the exception set forth in 
subsection (j) of this section, the Court of International Trade shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against the United States, its agencies, or 
4
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1989], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol16/iss1/3
1989] Jurisdictional Quagmire 43 
outlines specifically when suit may be brought in the CIT. Of rele-
vance to this article is the language of§ 1581(i)(l)-(4). This section 
reflects Congress' intent to legislate a catch-all jurisdictional provi-
sion.13 With any broad residual jurisdictional grant, the key ques-
tion is the breadth of the statute and its impact on federal ques-
tion jurisdiction. Section 1581(i)(l)-(4) is no exception. Because 
the statute fails to define several important terms,14 one must ex-
amine and analyze the legislative history of the Customs Courts 
Act of 198016 for guidance on how to interpret the crucial elements. 
Subsection (i) represents a residual grant of jurisdiction 
designed to emphasize the peculiar nature of those questions which 
properly belong before the CIT for resolution. In addition to a sub-
stantive focu~ on the particular issues over which the CIT could 
exercise its jurisdiction, Congress clearly, or so it thought, ex-
pressed its desire to avoid the jurisdictional conflicts between the 
former specialized court16 and the district courts. As the House Re-
port on the Customs Courts Act of 1980 states: 
Id. 
Over the years complex jurisdictional issues have been raised 
in cases arising out of our international trade laws due to the ill-
defined division of jurisdiction between this Court's predecessor, .. 
and the federal district courts [citation omitted] .... [The] Cus-
toms Courts Act of 1980 creates a comprehensive system for the 
its officers, that arises out of any law of the United States providing for 
(1) revenue from imports or tonnage; 
(2) tariffs, duties, fees or other taxes on the importation of merchandise for reasons 
other than the raising of revenue; 
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of merchandise 
for reasons other than the protection of the public health or safety; or 
(4) administrative and enforcement with respect to the matters referred to in 
paragraphs (1)-(3) of this subsection and subsections (a)-(h) of this section. 
(j) The Court of International Trade shall not have jurisdiction of any civil 
action arising under section 305 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 
13. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3729, 3759. See also Cohen, The "Residual Jurisdiction" of the 
Court of International Trade Under the Customs Court Act of 1980, 26 N.Y.L. Sett. L. REV. 
471, 472 (1981). 
14. The key terms necessary for a completely clear interpretation of the statute include: 
revenue, imports, tonnage, duties, fees, other taxes, embargoes, quantitative restrictions, ad-
ministration, and enforcement. Support for the proposition that definitions of these ele-
ments are essential derives from the fact that the Supreme Court in K-Mart I had to look 
beyond the statute and legislative history to lexicographic sources in order to interpret the 
scope of the statute's application. See K-Mart I, 108 S. Ct. at 956-57. 
15. 28 U.S.C. Ch. 95, discusses the overall jurisdiction of the CIT. 
16. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3729, 3731. 
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judicial review of civil actions arising out of international trade 
law, and greatly expands the status, jurisdiction and powers of the 
former [court].17 
With Congress' attention focused on jurisdictional delineation, 
the members of both the House and Senate Committees, which 
drafted, revised, and offered the legislation, acknowledged the 
depth of difficulty international trade participants experienced 
each time any one of them chose to challenge some ruling by an 
executive agency involved in international trade decision-making. 
The legislative history is replete with emphasises on reform, clar-
ity, and certainty. For example, the House Judiciary Committee 
commented on the "much-needed reform and clarification of the 
statutes goveriiing the status, jurisdiction and powers" of the 
CIT.18 
In addition, Congress explicitly expressed its motivations be-
hind the legislation as clarifying and consolidating jurisdiction. 
The legislation seeks to accomplish several major goals[:] [includ-
ing] [t]he reemphasis and clarification of Congress' intent that the 
expertise and national jurisdiction of the [CIT] ... be exclusively 
utilized in the resolution of conflicts and disputes arising out of the 
tariff and international trade laws, thereby eliminating the present 
jurisdictional conflicts between [the CIT] and the federal district .. 
. courts.19 
Regardless of this clearly expressed intent, difficulties in judicial 
interpretation of § 1581 (i) arose. Since 1981, at least ten court de-
cisions have disagreed on the scope of the residual jurisdictional 
grant. 20 This failure to establish, with some certainty, the suits 
that properly belong before the CIT has led to continued confusion 
among the business world and the government-the precise evil 
Congress sought to remedy.21 In accepting certiorari in the K Mart 
17. DiJub Leasing Corp. v. United States, 505 F. Supp. 1113, 1114-15 (Ct. Int'l Trade 
1980)(quoting H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 19, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3731). 
18. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 27-28, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3739. 
19. See id. See also DiJub, 505 F. Supp. at 1115. 
20. Compare Allen Sugar Co. v. Brady, 706 F. Supp. 49 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989) and 
COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 844, with Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1419 and DiJub, 505 F. Supp. 
at 1113. 
21. The House Judiciary Committee wrestled with the confusion the then-existing stat-
utory framework caused. The Committee concluded: 
The purpose of this broad jurisdictional grant is to eliminate the confusion which 
currently exists as to the demarcation between the jurisdiction of the district courts 
and the Court of International Trade. This provision makes it clear that all suits of 
6
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I case, it appeared that the Supreme Court was finally in a position 
to correct the vagueness of § 1581(i)'s language. 
II. EXISTING CASE LAW 
Since 1981, the CIT and the district courts have struggled to 
interpret the jurisdictional grant in § 1581(i) consistently so as to 
both satisfy congressional intent and fulfill the expectations of the 
business community. The following cases represent a cross-section 
of analyses from the CIT and the district courts: Allen Sugar Co. 
v. Brady,22 Schaper Manufacturing Co. v. Regan,23 Manufacture 
de Machines du Haut-Rhin v. Von Raab,24 Olympus Corp. v. 
United States,26 Vivitar Corp. v. United States,26 and The Coali-
tion to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United 
States. 21 Each will be examined to determine where the similarities 
and differences lie within judicial interpretation. 
A. Allen Sugar Co. v. Brady28 
Allen Sugar Company challenged the Customs Service's classi-
fication of imported sweetener products under the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States [HTSUS]. Customs' letter 
ruling officially classified the blended sweetener under Item 
1701.99.00, HTSUS. Rather than protesting, as was its right, Allen 
Sugar Company filed in the CIT, pursuant to § 1581(i), for a pre-
liminary injunction to restrain Customs from denying entry. The 
Government challenged the CIT's jurisdiction under subsection (i), 
alleging that Allen had not exhausted its administrative remedies, 
and therefore, was not properly before the court. 
The CIT's analysis of jurisdiction began with a review of the 
exhaustion of remedies doctrine. 29 Although the exhaustion of ad-
the type specified are properly commenced only in the Court of International 
Trade. The Committee has included this provision in the legislation to eliminate 
much of the difficulty experienced by international trade litigants .... 
H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 47, reprinted in 1980 U.S. ConE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS at 7118. 
22. 706 F. Supp. 49 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989). 
23. 566 F. Supp. 894 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983). 
24. 569 F. Supp. 877 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983). 
25. 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986). 
26. 8 CIT 109, 593 F. Supp. 420 (1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
27. 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
28. 706 F. Supp. 49 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989). 
29. Id. at 52. See also National Corn Growers Ass'n v. Baker, 840 F.2d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 
1988). 
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ministrative remedies is required to avoid review of "strictly ad-
ministrative judgments,"30 the court determined that the process 
could be bypassed through invocation of residual jurisdiction 
under § 1581(i).31 However, this circumvention is not without lim-
its. "Section 1581(i) 'may not be invoked when jurisdiction under 
another subsection of§ 1581 is or could have been available, unless 
the remedy provided under that other subsection would be mani-
festly inadequate.' "32 
In light of these limits, the court held that Allen · Sugar Com-
pany failed to exercise an existing avenue of review-Le., the pro-
test. Its failure to do so disqualified it from establishing jurisdic-
tion under another provision of§ 1581. The court reasoned that a 
failure to exercise an existing option renders jurisdiction under 
other subsections of § 1581 improper.33 Citing Miller & Co. v. 
United States,34 the court held that: "[t]he remedy available to 
plaintiff was not manifestly inadequate; it was simply not 
sought."35 As such, no jurisdiction existed under § 1581(i). 
Allen Sugar Company also argued that Customs' failure to act 
timely on its petition rendered its assertion of jurisdiction under § 
1581(i) proper.36 The court's short answer focused on the fact that 
no matter what actions Customs may or may not have taken, the 
gist of the challenge was properly handled as a protest under an 
existing statutory framework. 37 
Finally, Allen Sugar Company alleged that jurisdiction also ex-
isted under § 1581(i) because the case really involved a quantita-
tive restriction pursuant to § 1581(i)(3). The court, however, sum-
marily dismissed this argument by acknowledging that Customs' 
action did involve a quantitative restriction, which arose from the 
30. Allen Sugar, 706 F. Supp. at 52. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. (quoting Miller & Co. v. United States, 824 F.2d 961, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 108 S. Ct. 773 (1988)). The facts in Miller are similar to those in Allen Sugar. In 
both instances, each party, dissatisfied with Customs' rulings, chose not to pursue existing 
administrative protest remedies. Rather, each sought to establish jurisdiction under § 
1581(i). The Miller majority was clear and unequivocal that § 1581(i) was not designed to 
allow circumvention of the administrative framework. National Corn, 840 F.2d at 963. 
33. Allen Sugar, 706 F. Supp. at 53. 
34. 824 F.2d 961 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 773 (1988). The Miller court 
held: "No § 1581(i) jurisdiction is found where importers could have taken steps to qualify 
under § 1581(a), and the remedy under that subsection would have been adequate."Id. at 
963. 
35. Allen Sugar, 706 F. Supp. 49 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
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classification of the blended sweetener under the HTSUS rather 
than the Tariff Schedules of the United States [TSUS]. Thus, a 
classification, properly protestable, preceded the quantitative re-
striction. 38 The Allen Sugar decision upholds the post-1986 Fed-
eral Circuit's view that § 1581(i) is to be narrowly construed.39 
B. Schaper Manuacturing Co. v. Regan•0 
Schaper Manufacturing owned toy vehicles with registered 
trademarks, which were recorded, per customs regulations, with 
the Customs Service.•1 Upon notification from Customs that sev-
eral cases of suspected pirated copies were being held in the Pitts-
burgh port, Schaper posted the requisite bond to demand exclu-
sion of the items. •2 The same situation occurred twice more, 
necessitating two more bonds and two more exclusion requests. 
Eventually, Customs determined that only some of the items being 
held were pirated copies. Schaper then requested a return of its 
bonds and that separate bonds be filed for each infringing toy 
model, rather than for the entire shipment in question."3 The re-
quest was denied. Pursuant to Customs regulations, Schaper was 
required to obtain signatures from the importer of the infringing 
toys holding Customs harmless from any consequences in re-
turning the bonds. The importer refused to sign the agreement and 
the Secretary of the Treasury was enjoined from releasing the 
bonds to Schaper.•• 
Schaper brought suit in the CIT and defendant, Secretary Re-
gan on behalf of the United States, moved to have the suit dis-
missed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Boe denied 
the government's motion, outlining the basis for the CIT's 
jurisdiction. 
The opinion established a test required to assess whether the 
CIT had jurisdiction under § 1581(i): 
In determining whether a cause of action might be embraced by 
the jurisdictional grant bestowed upon this court by the Congress, 
it is necessary that the gravamen of the complaint be determined 
. . . the thrust of the grievance alleged and the relief sought by the 
38. Id. 
39. Miller, 824 F.2d at 963. 
40. 566 F. Supp. 894 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983). 
41. Id. at 895. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 895-96. 
44. Id. at 896. 
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plaintiff [must] relate[] to the regulations promulgated by customs 
and their administration and enforcement by that agency. 46 
The court proceeded to explain that the issue at hand involved 
customs regulations regarding revenue. Judge Boe accorded "reve-
nue from imports"46 an expansive definition and held that it en-
compassed the actions taken by plaintiff Schaper. "Although a reg-
ulation may not be specifically designed to collect revenue in the 
form of a duty upon importation, its purpose, nonetheless, may 
cause it to be a concomitant part of the function of raising 'reve-
nue from imports.' "47 Examining the totality of the circumstances, 
Judge Boe concluded that the provision by which Schaper acted, 
19 C.F.R. § 133.43, served 
as a corollary to the acknowledged primary functions of the agency 
in determining whether merchandise seeking importation should 
be excluded as well as in determining the proper amount of duty to. 
be assessed upon merchandise granted the right of importation .... 
19 C.F.R. § 133.43 [is] an integral part of the 'administration and 
enforcement' of laws and regulations required in connection with 
the raising of 'revenue from imports' and are embraced within the 
jurisdictional grant to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4).48 
Judge Boe predicated the CIT's jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 
1581(i)(l) and integrated its interpretation with subsection (i)(4)'s 
"administration and enforcement" language. The upshot of Judge 
Boe's opinion was a finding of jurisdiction based on an analysis of 
both § 1581(i)(l) and (i)(4). 
C. Manufacture de Machines du Haut-Rhin v. Von Raab49 
Walther-trademarked pistols were imported from Germany 
into the United States, carrying with them a reputation for "high 
quality, reliability, and performance."60 The trademark was li-
censed to Maurhin, who continued to manufacture the pistols con-
tinuously under certain license agreements. The Customs Service, 
in 1982, detained two shipments of pistols pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 
1526 that were manufactured, but not imported, by Mauhrin. Cus-
toms deter~ined that the name on the pistols qualified as a trade 
45. Id. 
46. 28 u.s.c. § 1581(i)(l). 
47. Schaper Mfg., 566 F. Supp. at 897. 
48. Id. at 898. 
49. 569 F. Supp. 877 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983). 
50. Id. at 878. 
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name rather than a trademark.51 The U.S. trademark "Walther" 
was assigned by Carl Walther to importer Interarms, who then 
duly registered the mark with Customs to trigger the necessary im-
port protection. 52 Customs stated that since Interarms owned and 
registered the Walther trademark,53 items bearing the Maurhin 
trademark would be excluded from entry.54 Maurhin moved for a 
preliminary injunction in the CIT and the issue of jurisdiction 
arose. 
Both parties raised the question of whether jurisdiction prop-
erly existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). Defendants contended that 
judicial review was premature because plaintiff had failed to ex-
haust its administrative remedies, 55 and the court agreed with the 
defendants. Judge Carmen stated that: 
The jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade under § 
1581(i) is expressly 'in addition to the jurisdiction conferred . .. by 
subsections (a)-(h),' and ... the legislative history of§ 1581 further 
evidences Congress' intention that subsection (i) not be used gen-
erally to bypass administrative review by meaningful protest. 66 
Judge Carmen interpreted subsection (i) as independent of 
subsections (a)-(h) yet held that subsection (i) jurisdiction was not 
all-encompassing. The court held that required administrative pro-
cedures must first be exhausted prior to proper vesting of jurisdic-
tion in the CIT. Nothing in Judge Carmen's opinion, however, re-
stricts the interpretation of subsection (i). 
D. Olympus Corp. v. United States57 
Olympus Corporation imported Olympus-brand products into 
the United States as exclusive distributor of such goods. Olympus 
51. Id. at 879. 
52. Id. 
53. Maurhin's mark, appearing on all guns so produced, was "LIC. EXCL. 
WALTHER" and "LIC. WALTHER PP." 
54. Manufacture de Machines, 569 F. Supp. at 879. 
55. Id. at 880. 
56. Id. at 882 (quoting United States v. Uniroyal Inc., 687 F.2d 467, 472 (C.C.P.A. 
1982)). 
57. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 
315 (2d Cir. 1986). Because the district court was not presented with a jurisdictional argu-
ment, this subsection will review the analysis of CIT jurisdiction followed in the Second 
Circuit. The question of subject-matter jurisdiction and appropriate forums did not arise 
until intervenor, 47th Street Photo, raised the issue. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 316. The Second 
Circuit's views on jurisdiction concur with the D.C. Circuit's decision in COPIAT. See supra 
note 11. 
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filed suit in the District Court challenging the applicable Treasury 
regulations68 that permitted the importation of trademarked goods 
without the American trademark owner's permission, if the Ameri-
can trademark holder was a parent or subsidary of, or had common 
ownership with, the foreign manufacturer.69 Olympus argued that 
the regulations exceeded the scope and intent of the statute, which 
they were promulgated to implement.60 The District Court found 
Olympus' arguments unconvincing and concluded that the regula-
tions were a lawful exercise of Customs' authority to implement 
the statute in question. 61 
On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the merits of the · district 
court's decision, but also dealt extensively with the question of 
conflicting jurisdictional interpretations of § 1581(i). The court re-
viewed the CIT's decision in Vivitar, noting that the references to 
legislative history, while accurately cited, did not provide an ade-
quate basis for vesting jurisdiction in the CIT.62 
In short order, the Second Circuit determined that suits aris-
ing under 19 U.S.C. § 1526, relating to the importation of grey-
market goods, properly vested jurisdiction in the district courts to 
settle the dispute. 63 The majority disagreed with the CIT's holding 
in Vivitar Corp. v. United States64 that, where the protest remedy 
is inappropriate or unavailable, the substantive issues may be re-
viewed under § 1581(i)(4). In addition, the majority held that the 
issues at hand involved the standard federal questions of trade-
mark and antitrust law, matters properly outside the scope of the 
CIT's jurisdiction.66 The majority stated that the issues still do not 
belong before the CIT even though they "tangentially relate[] to 
the protest procedure."66 In line with this statement the court fur-
ther noted that: "[s]ection 1581(i)(4) properly gives the CIT juris-
diction only of those matters that arise from protests themselves, 
not of all issues that conceivably could arise in a protest action 
58. 19 C.F.R. § 133 et seq. 
59. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982); 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(2) (1985). As noted earlier in the text, 
the validity of the Customs Service's regulations or of § 526 is not analyzed in this article. 
Any allusion to the regulations, the statute, or both is purely for background purposes. 
60. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 317. 
61. Olympus, 627 F. Supp. 911. 
62. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 318. 
63. Id. at 316 
64. 585 F. Supp. 1419 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 1055. 
65. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 318. 
66. Id. 
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under a hypothetical fact situation."67 This restrictive view ap-
pears to derive from the fact that the transaction in question is 
held to be a trademark matter first, and a customs or international 
trade matter second;68 thus, the court held that jurisdiction prop-
erly vested in the district courts. 
E. Vivitar Corp. v. United States69 
The CIT elaborately and thoroughly examined the issue of ju-
risdiction under § 1581(i) in the Vivitar case. Plaintiff, Vivitar 
Corp., brought suit to exclude merchandise bearing a valid Vivitar 
trademark because it was imported without Vivitar's consent. The 
Government moved to dismiss the suit, alleging that the CIT 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter because it involved a trade-
mark rather than customs issue. In denying the government's mo-
tion, Judge Restani decided that the issue at hand involved a ques-
tion of international trade over which the CIT had exclusive 
jurisdiction.7° Citing the legislative history, Judge Restani found 
that the case "ar[o]se out of circumstances where an international 
trade dispute involve[d] trademark issues."71 With this presump-
tion in mind, the court proceeded to analyze the validity of juris-
diction in the CIT. 
67. Id. 
68. Upon closer analysis, the dangers inherent in the Second Circuit's approach surface. 
By determining jurisdiction simply as a matter of what "issue" is dealt with first or which 
issue appears to be the underlying concern of the parties, the court has injected an undue 
amount of uncertainty and instability into the jurisdictional process. Determining that a 
case is "more one of trademark law than customs law," as was done in the D.C. Circuit's 
decision in COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 906 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1986), renders the process of determin-
ing jurisdiction too subjective. Assessing whether one issue precedes another, or underlies 
another is analogous to the situation outlined by the Supreme Court in the Liberty Oil case 
where whether one presents an equitable or legal issue first can determine whether one is 
entitled to a jury trial. Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 235 (1922). Applied 
in these circumstances, different jurisdictional fora are appropriate depending on whether a 
litigant presents a customs law or trademark law issue first. Congress hardly had this type of 
possible forum shopping in mind when it chose to inject certainty into the process of bring-
ing suits in the international trade area. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. 
69. 585 F. Supp. 1419 (Ct. lnt'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
70. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1422. In assessing the type of problem before the Court, 
Judge Restani focused on the overall question, rather than the one or two discrete issues 
raised by both parties. Based on this broad overview, the Court found the government's 
argument, that the real issue was one of trademark law, unpersuasive. Id. "Litigation of 
issues such as those presented in Vivitar or COPIAT cannot be handled in a piecemeal 
fashion. Dissecting each allegation or claim so that one can attempt to determine which 
court has jurisdiction is both counterproductive and fruitless. It usually leads to confusion 
and/or uncertainty." Id. See supra note 68. 
71. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1422. 
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Jurisdiction in the CIT is not necessarily defeated because the 
statute upon which CIT jurisdiction is predicated may serve more 
than one goal, Judge Restani concluded.72 The statutory provision 
of subsection (i) provides the CIT with a broad range of issues with 
which it can deal whenever questions of international trade arise. 
In assisting litigants to decide whether an issue is properly before 
the CIT, the Vivitar cotirt established a jurisdictional test. The 
court must determine the "gravamen of the complaint" by review-
ing all the circumstances surrounding the complaint. The court 
shall examine "the allegations contained in the complaint as well 
as ... all the proceedings ... before ... [the] court."73 The grava-
men of the complaint involves a subject matter properly before the 
CIT if "the thrust of the grievance alleged and the relief sought 
[relates] to the regulations promulgated by customs and their ad-
ministration and enforcement. "74 Pursuant to this test, Judge 
Restani held that the case was properly before the CIT. Under her 
analysis: 
The central issue in this case is the regulation of international 
trade in goods bearing genuine trademarks, rather than trademark 
law. 
The right to regulate the use of a trademark on genuine goods 
arises only in international trade transactions. No other use of a 
genuine trademark on goods entitled to bear the mark is restricted. 
The Customs Service's regulation of imports of genuine trademark 
goods is uniquely a concern of international trade law.7~ 
Thus the gravamen of the complaint was determined within the 
context of international trade, not in a vacuum. 
Judge Restani, however, did not end her inquiry there. Once 
she established jurisdiction on one basis, she proceeded to buttress 
her position further with public policy arguments and references to 
legislative history. The CIT should retain jurisdiction under § 
1581 (i)°, she said, because the court was designed to create and 
72. Cornet Stores v. Morton, 632 F.2d 96, 99 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Customs Court jurisdic-
tion is not defeated because a statute or regulation serves other ends in addition to recog-
nized customs purposes, so long as there exists 'a substantial relation to traditional customs 
purposes . .. .'"); see also Jerlian Watch Co. v. United States Dep't of Comm., 597 F.2d 687, 
691 (9th Cir. 1979). Although both of these cases precede the Customs Courts Act of 1980, 
the underlying philosophy of specialized courts is the same, as is the view toward determin-
ing jurisdiction in a specialized court. 
73. Viuitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1423 (quoting Schaper Manufacturing Co. v. Regan, 566 F. 
Supp. 894, 896 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983)). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 1423. 
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maintain a uniform interpretation of the law.76 
This Court's basic purpose is to provide "a comprehensive system 
of judicial review of civil actions arising from import transactions, 
utilizing the specialized expertise of the [CIT] ... [to] ensure ... 
uniformity in the judicial decisionmaking process." [Citation omit-
ted]. International trade law and Customs Service regulations must 
have a uniform national interpretation to provide a degree of cer-
tainty to those involved in complex international trade transac-
tions .... [This] helps avoid conflicting interpretations of interna-
tional trade law. 77 
53 
In a nutshell, the CIT's jurisdiction was supported by statu-
tory, regulatory and public policy grounds. The court ultimately 
concluded that it had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to § 
1581(i)(4).78 
One final argument involved the unique expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius doctrine. This doctrine provides that the "expres-
sion of one thing is the exclusion of another."79 When certain items 
are specified in a statute, the exclusion of all others from its opera-
tion may be inferred. 80 Based on this statutory construction doc-
trine, Judge Restani also held that: 
[S]ince Congress needed to explicitly exclude from this court's ju-
risdiction statutes outlawing certain imports, Congress obviously 
intended § 1581(i) to give this court jurisdiction generally over 
statutes prohibiting importation of merchandise. . . . Since, in 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Judge Restani quotes some convincing language supporting her conclusion that the 
jurisdictional grant is broad. The CIT has held that: "[u]nless these preceding jursdictional 
subsections [1581(a)-(h)] express or contain in their manifest legislative history a limitation 
on jurisdiction of other related actions, they do not operate to diminish the broad grant of 
jurisdiction contained in section 158l(i)." Sacilor, Acieries et Laminoirs de Lorraine v. 
United States, 542 F. Supp. 1020, 1020 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982). Under the terms of this quote, 
without an express limitation on subsection 158l(i), the grant of authority should include all 
issues relating to international trade. See also Cohen, supra note 13. 
Just as the CIT supported its conclusions on jurisdiction with reference to the statute 
and legislative history, so does the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a 
similarly specialized court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1989 Supp.). In several cases the Court of 
Appeals has struggled to define the question of when issues "arise under" 28 U.S.C. § 1338 
patent law. See Schwarzkopf Development Corp. v. Ti-Coating, Inc., 800 F.2d 240, 243-44 
(Fed. Cir. 1986); USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 770 F.2d 1035, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1985); 
American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 821 (1984). The Court of Appeals has referred extensively to the legislative history 
of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 to establish when proper patent issues vest 
appellate jurisdiction. Id. 
79. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 692 (4th ed. 1951). 
80. Id. 
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§ 1583(i)(3), Congress expressly eliminated one type of statute out-
lawing imports, by inf ere nee Congress intended other statutes bar-
ring imports to be included within § 1581(i)(3).81 
On all the above-enumerated grounds, the Vivitar court held 
it had jurisdiction over the issues presented. 
F. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks 
v. United States82 
The district court's approach to the question of jurisdiction in 
COP/AT was just as well-reasoned as the Vivitar court's opinion. 
In COP/AT, the Coalition alleged that the Customs regulations im-
plementing § 526 contradicted certain provisions of the Tariff Act 
of 1930 and the Lanham Act of 1946. The argument included a 
contention by COPIAT that the trademarks of its members were 
not protected to the fullest extent permissible under the law. This 
lack of protection, resulting from the allowed importation of grey-
market goods,83 injured COPIAT's members both financially and 
commercially. Imported grey-market goods did not carry the same 
warranty and service protections of the genuinely trademarked, 
properly imported goods. Failure to warrant the quality, condition 
and merchantability of the goods resulted in damage to the owners 
of the goods whose trademark they bore. Consumers are not in a 
position to distinguish between properly and improperly imported 
items. On this basis, COPIAT sued in the district court alleging 
that the issue was a question of trademark law first and customs 
law second. 
The district court noted at the outset that the threshold ques-
tion was one of appropriate subject matter jurisdiction.84 Acknowl-
edging the similarity in suit and issues to the Vivitar case,86 Judge 
Johnson rejected the Vivitar rationale, predicating district court 
jurisdiction on one of three possible grounds: 
1) general federal question jurisdiction,86 
81. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1427. 
82. 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 
1986). 
83. A grey-market good is defined as "a foreign-manufactured good bearing a valid 
United States trademark, which is imported without the consent of the U.S. trademark 
owner." K-Mart I, 108 S. Ct. at 954. 
84. COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 847. 
85. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1419. 
86. 28 u.s.c. § 1331. 
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2) trademark question jurisdiction,87 or 
3) Lanham Act jurisdiction. 88 
While dismissing jurisdiction under the Lanham Act, 89 Judge 
Johnson held that federal question jurisdiction vested jurisdiction 
in the district courts. The court focused its inquiry on "the pivotal 
question ... [;] whether the construction by the Customs Service, 
as embodied in the challenged regulations, is sufficiently reasona-
ble."90 The court's characterization of the question led to the con-
clusion that the issues involved the executive's authority in 
promulgating these regulations vis-a-vis imported trademarked 
goods rather than the enforcement and administration qf the regu-
lations.91 In spite of this conclusion, Judge Johnson still noted that 
the issue related to the "Customs Service as the agency charged 
with the administration of the laws pertaining to entry of 
imports. "92 
Lastly, Judge Johnson acknowledged the actions in the case 
involved issues of international trade. However, the precepts and 
guidance of the legislative history, she inferred, should not be mis-
construed to the point of divesting district courts of all jurisdiction 
in international trade matters. Such issues are still species of fed-
eral questions. In closing the jurisdictional section of her opinion, 
Judge Johnson found that the case involved both international 
trade disputes and trademark problems. The existence of the 
trademark problems vests jurisdiction in the district courts. 93 The 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the trial 
court's jurisdictional decision.94 
III. ANALYSIS OF LOWER COURT CASE LAW 
Not surprisingly, at least one consistency exists in each case 
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). 
88. 15 U.S.C. §1211. See COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 847. 
89. The court held that Lanham Act jurisdiction, a species of federal question, may be 
invoked solely when the imported goods bear counterfeit or spurious trademarks. Such was 
not the case here. Both parties, and intervenor, acknowledged that the goods imported in 
this suit bore valid trademarks. COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 848. 
90. Id. at 851. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 852 (emphasis added). The inherent contradiction in phraseology is hardly 
dispositive or determinative of how an issue is properly characterized for jurisdictional pur-
poses. It is worthy of note, however, that Judge Johnson's phrasing may indicate an under-
current of either doubt or confusion as to whether the case really is properly before the 
district court. 
93. Id. at 847. 
94. COPIAT, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
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discussing § 1581(i), whether jurisdiction is invoked or not, the 
cases all involve some aspect of international trade.95 The differ-
ences arise in the application of fairly consistent principles to the 
facts of each case and in the determination of the amount of 
credence tlie legislative history of the Customs Courts Act is to be 
given. These differences and uncertainty led to the conflicting re-
sults that ultimately necessitated Supreme Court review,96 a review 
which has not necessarily laid the uncertainty to rest. 
In carefully examining the reasoning of several lower court de-
cisions, several logical flaws leap to the eye. This flawed logic is 
best evidenced in the district court's decision in COP/AT and the 
Second Circuit's approach in Olympus Corp. These decisions pro-
vide insight into how the lower courts have had difficulty in assess-
ing the existence, or lack thereof, of jurisdiction over international 
trade matters. 
No court is willing to give up jurisdiction, especially when 
cases in a particular area prove interesting, challenging, or ground-
breaking. The international trade arena is no exception. The 
amount of controversy that greeted the formation of the · Customs 
Courts Act in 1980 exemplifies the diametrically opposed attitudes 
governing the carving out of specialized jurisdiction from general 
federal question jurisdiction.97 This controversy carried over into 
the judiciary whenever a member of the bench attempted to inter-
pret the carved out portion of federal question jurisdiction.98 
Rather than solve the controversy, courts have perpetuated the 
problems by seeking to exercise jurisdiction through a slanted or 
95. See, e.g., Olympus, 792 F.2d at 315 (suit involved Customs seizures of grey-market 
goods); Allen Sugar, 706 F. Supp. 49 (question of Customs classification of sugar sweetener); 
DiJub, 505 F. Supp. 1113 (revocation of corporation's customhouse cartman's license). 
96. K-Mart I, 108 S. Ct. 950 (1988). 
97. S_ee Cohen, supra note 13. Professor Cohen thoroughly outlines the battle over the 
wording of the jurisdictional clauses of the Customs Courts Act of 1980. Congress acknowl-
edged its intention to expand existing Customs Court jurisdiction while carving out species 
of federal questions which would be handled exclusively by a specialized court. Id. at 472-74, 
498-99. Unquestionably, the jurisdiction of the district courts would always exceed that of 
the specialized courts, except in those areas where Congress specifically designated issues as 
falling within the purview of the specialized court. The entire focus of the Customs Courts 
Act of 1980 was to bring uniformity to the field of international trade and to divest the 
district courts of their general federal question jurisdiction in international trade matters. 
Id. at 474. 
98. Compare Uniroyal, 687 F.2d 467 (C.C.P.A 1982) and Allen Sugar, 1989 Ct. Int'l 
Trade LEXIS 15 (February 9, 1989) with Miller, 824 F.2d 961 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
108 S. Ct. 773 (1988) and American Ass'n of Exporters and Importers-Textile and Apparel 
Group v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1985) and DiJub, 505 F. Supp. 1113 (Ct. 
Int'l Trade 1980). 
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stretched reading of legislation or selective legislative history. Such 
an attitude does not do litigants, or the judiciary, justice. 
In the district court COP/AT decision, Judge Johnson ex-
amined the issues involved as matters of trademark law first, 
rather than customs. 99 Her view was supported by the District of 
Columbia Circuit.100 Based on her decision, that the crux or grava-
men of the complaints rested in the general federal question do-
main, the district court exercised its jurisdiction. The court, how-
ever, failed to explain under what circumstances district courts, 
under her analysis, would ever be divested of jurisdiction. Any 
statute passed by Congress and disputed by litigants presents fed-
eral questions. As applicable to the COP/AT case, Congress specifi-
cally carved out an exception to federal question jurisdiction, 
which the court chose to circumvent by re-analyzing the type of 
case before it. It can hardly be said that Congress intended the 
courts to be able to play with issue presentation to the extent of 
reinstituting forum shopping after Congress expressly chose to 
avoid that result. 101 Yet that is precisely the result achieved in the 
COP/AT decision. 
Even the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia endorsed 
this view by holding that the issues presented to the district court 
were more issues of trademark than customs laws.102 The flaw in 
this subjective approach is self-evident. How is one court to deter-
mine which issue is subsidiary to which other issue when multi-
issue litigation is at hand? The Supreme Court effectively rejected 
this approach in its Liberty Oil1°3 and Dairy Queen 1°" decisions 
when it held that it was inappropriate for litigants to argue that 
the presentation of one issue prior to another was proper in order 
to restrict the access of a litigant to his right to a jury trial. The 
same holds true for the COP/AT decision. It is manifestly im-
proper for the district court to deny both congressional intent and 
to endorse a forum shopping practice simply on the basis of 
whether an issue is presented "more as one of trademark than cus-
toms law." Such subjectivity renders certainty in litigation 
99. COP/AT, 598 F. Supp. at 847. 
100. COP/AT, 790 F.2d at 906 n.3. 
101. H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., 47, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CoNG. 
& ADMIN. NEWS at 7118. 
102. COP/AT, 790 F.2d at 906 n.3. 
103. Liberty Oil, 260 U.S. at 235 (1922). 
104. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). 
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unlikely.106 
In addition, the COP/AT court's approach calls into question 
the proper deference due both Congress and the statutes at hand. 
While courts are co-equal branches to the executive and legislative, 
each branch has its own purpose. That of the judiciary is to inter-
pret the laws passed by Congress. A serious question arises as to 
how and upon what the courts must rely in rendering an interpre-
tation of laws. As with the COP/AT decision, the court has appar-
ently determined that Congress was incorrect in its determination 
that cases or issues relating to international trade and customs law 
belonged before a specialized court. In ignoring Congress' intent, 
the court's interpretation obviously exceeds the scope of judicial 
authority. 
The COP/AT courts, however, are not alone in their interpre-
tation. The Second Circuit in Olympus agreed, in theory, with the 
D.C. Circuit's approach. In addition, the Olympus court made 
short shrift of what legislative history existed supporting the inter-
pretation of jurisdiction in the CIT when the issue involved an em-
bargo.106 The court stated: 
The reference by Senator Kellogg . . . to that section in the 1922 
Senate debate as a proposal "to enforce the trademark laws by a 
prohibition and an embargo against shipments," (cites omitted), is 
entitled to little weight. To treat section 526 as an "embargo" 
would be to give that term a construction far broader than its ordi-
nary meaning without an indication of such congressional intent.107 
The ability of the court in the same breath to make references to 
legislative history, discount those references, and then decide that 
Congress could not have authorized such broad definitions because 
the courts deem it so, is clearly the height of judicial activism. Al-
though the legislative history is not accorded the same weight as 
the statutory language itself, in cases where the language is ambig-
uous, the history is the primary source examined to determine ei-
ther meaning or legislative intent.108 To so summarily dismiss ex-
isting legislative history, sparse though it may be, on the grounds 
that such a broad definition is not what the court believes, is an 
impermissibly broad extension of judicial interpretation. 
Both of these cases, therefore, illustrate the three major flaws 
105. See supra note 9. 
106. Olympus Corp. , 792 F.2d at 319. 
107. Id. 
108. See, e.g., Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981); Martin J. Simko Con-
str., Inc. v. United States, 852 F.2d 540, 542 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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of lower court opinions which preclude the CIT's exercise of juris-
diction under § 1581(i): (1) the cases premise jurisdiction on gen-
eral federal question jurisdiction; (2) the cases either ignore, or ac-
knowledge and then ignore, existing legislative history defining 
Congress' intent; and (3) the cases demonstrate an activism 
designed to preserve federal question jurisdiction in the district 
court at the expense of specialized courts. The Supreme Court's 
opinion in K-Mart I was squarely presented with exemplars of 
these flaws and the majority chose to contribute to, rather than 
clarify, the confusion. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
A. The Majority 
In a five to three majority,1°9 the Court affirmed the COP/AT 
appellate court's decision upholding jurisdiction in the district 
court, but not the appellate court's reasoning. The focus of the ma-
jority rested on the view that if § 1526(a) did not constitute an 
"embargo" on goods, then § 1581(i) did not vest exclusive jurisdic-
tion in the CIT. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, held 
that § 1526(a) did not qualify as an "embargo", and therefore, 
could not vest exclusive jurisdiction in the CIT. Noting, as did the 
dissent, that the statute is silent regarding the definition of em-
bargo, Justice Brennan turned to a standard lexicographic source 
to define the term. 
An embargo is a "[g]overnment order prohibiting commercial 
trade with individuals or businesses of other nations."110 The ma-
jority states that embargoes are found not only in the trade area as 
tools for implementing trade policy. Rather, trade represents only 
one aspect of the multifaceted purP.oses for embargoes. m With 
this definition and policy framework, the majority holds that Con-
gress adopted a "common sense" meaning of the term embargo. 
Without any reference to legislative history or the statute, Justice 
Brennan cavalierly states: "[a]s the ... definitions suggest, the or-
109. Justice Anthony Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this suit, 
although ironically, he was the author of the K-Mart II opinion on the substantive issue of 
the validity of the Customs Service regulations. See K-Mart II, 108 S. Ct. 1811. 
It is interesting to note that in the K-Mart I decision resolving the jurisdictional inter-
pretation of§ 1581(i)(l) and (4), Justice Brennan does not cite to a single case either from 
the district courts, the CIT, or the circuit courts, although certainly not for lack of prece-
dent. See supra notes 28 to 91 and accompanying text. 
110. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 468 (5th ed. 1979). 
111. K-Mart I, 108 S. Ct. at 956. 
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dinary meaning of 'embargo,' and the meaning that Congress ap-
parently adopted in the statutory language ... is a governmentally 
imposed quantitative restriction-of zero-on the importation of 
merchandise. m 12 
The Court then proceeds to distinguish "import prohibitions," 
which the parties to the suit utilized as synonymous to "embargo," 
from the term "embargo." The majority hangs its hat on this dis-
tinction, noting that a true embargo, while not necessarily an abso-
lute government action, must not have as one of its purposes the 
protection of a private right. 
An importation prohibition is not an embargo if rather than re-
flecting a governmental restriction on the quantity of a· particular 
product that will enter, it merely provides a mechanism by which a 
private party might, at its own option, enlist the Government's aid 
in restricting the quantity of imports in order to enforce a private 
right.113 
On this basis, Justice Brennan writes that Congress could have 
committed itself to granting the CIT exclusive jurisdiction of all 
embargoes or import prohibitions, if it so chose. The Court, how-
ever, is not free to depart from congressional language. To do so, 
"would infect the courts with the same jurisdictional confusion 
that Congress intended to cure. "114 And, Justice Brennan contin-
ues, although the Court does not necessarily understand why the 
fine distinctions were so drawn by Congress, it is not in a position 
to argue that congressional wording is inconsistent with congres-
sional intent. 
B. The Dissent 
The dissent is as succinct and straightforward as the majority. 
As noted earlier, the term embargo is not defined in the statute. 
However, Justice Scalia seeks assistance in both lexicographic 
sources and the legislative history. The dissent's most forceful ar-
gument revolves around the legislative history of § 1526(a)'s refer-
ence to the section as an "embargo."116 Senator Kellogg, during the 
112. Id. at 957. 
113. Id. (emphasis in original). 
114. Id. at 959. The majority appears to exercise an unusual form of judicial restraint, 
which results in a judicial determination exceeding the scope of interpreting the statute in 
question. While arguing that the Court is bound by the intent of Congress, the majority 
proceeds to develop its own definition of embargo-neither of which derives from Congres-
sional sources. 
115. 62 CONG. REC. 11,603 (1922) (statement of Senator Kellogg during floor debate on 
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debate on the bill, urged that § 1526(a) was "an embargo against 
any foreign country shipping goods here, where an American 
claims he has a trade-mark upon them."116 Interestingly enough, 
the majority fails to comment upon, let alone dispute, the dissent's 
legislative history reference. Rather, the majority simply focuses on 
its chosen dictionary definition and the logical extensions of that 
definition.117 
The dissent formulates a simple test, applicable to all transac-
tions to determine whether an embargo exists: 
an "embargo" is an import regulation that takes the form of a gov-
ernmental prohibition on imports, regardless of any exceptions it 
may contain and regardless of its ultimate purpose .... Under 
[this] analysis, when a provision has been identified as an import 
prohibition (however difficult that may be-and it is neither diffi-
cult nor contested here) that is an end of the matter. 118 
Justice Scalia also acknowledges, unlike the majority, the in-
herent dislike of the Court's failure to find jurisdiction over sub-
stantive issues presented to the Court. But in assessing the Court's 
jurisdiction, Scalia is quick to note that it is more important to 
make a correct jurisdictional decision, than to be result-oriented 
and seek to decide a substantive issue without adequate jurisdic-
tional foundation. 119 
V. ANALYSIS 
In assessing the impact of this Supreme Court decision and 
lower court case law, the focus rests on the outcome as well as the 
rationale. The District of Columbia district and appellate court 
COP/AT decisions and the K-Mart I majority both explicitly and 
implicitly determine that, regardless of congressional intent, statu-
tory language is to be construed in favor of not granting exclusive 
jurisdiction to specialized courts.120 Judge Johnson, in the district 
court's COP/AT opinion, invokes general federal jurisdiction as the 
basis for jurisdiction in the district court as opposed to the CIT. 
Under her logic, there would be no force given to any statute im-
the provisions of§ 1526(a)). The sparseness of some of the later legislative history is nota-
ble. See also Olympus Corp., 792 F.2d at 319 (wherein the Second Circuit summarily dis-
misses legislative history). 
116. 62 CONG. REC. 11,603 (1922). 
117. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text. 
118. K-Mart I, 108 S.Ct. at 962. 
119. Id. 
120. Cf. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2166 (1988). 
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parting jurisdiction to specialized courts because any question 
dealing with a federal statute is a general federal question. At the 
least, district courts could then claim concurrent, if not exclusive, 
jurisdiction on any matter. The claim of concurrent jurisdiction is 
precisely what Judge Johnson, and the Brennan majority, implic-
itly approve in both the COP/AT and K-Mart I decisions. Without 
doubt, such an interpretation flies in the face of and finds no ready 
support in the legislative history accompanying both the Customs 
Courts Act of 1980 and § 1526(a). 
In addition, both the COP/AT and K-Mart I decisions have 
successfully blurred the lines of distinction concerning when cus-
toms matters are subject to district court jurisdiction. The cases 
analyzed in this article apply to issues affecting the administration 
and enforcement of regulations and laws dealing with customs and 
trade matters in some form. This statement, in and of itself, is not 
contested by the COP/AT decisions nor the K-Mart I majority. 
Rather, the COP/AT courts acknowledge that each decided the va-
lidity of a customs regulation interpreting and construing § 1526, 
clearly the domain of the CIT, yet determined and succeeded in 
invoking federal question jurisdiction rather than the more special-
ized jurisdiction indicated. Such judicial overreaching is disturbing 
in its scope. Such activism succeeds in achieving particularly 
sought results in one case, while leaving behind a mass of confused, 
practically incoherent, guidelines for future litigants. 
Uncertainty also permeates the legacy of the K-Mart I Court. 
As Justice Scalia concluded in his K-Mart I dissent: "[t]hese un-
certainties arise from today's particular departure from the mean-
ing of 'embargo' as a 'governmental prohibition on importation.' 
Much greater, unfortunately, are the uncertainties that arise from 
today's acknowledgement of the principle that departure is permis-
sible. "121 The implementation of social, economic, or political 
agenda, while common at the Supreme Court, is inconsistent with 
the overall goals of the Court-clarification and interpretation of 
United States laws. A decision such as K-Mart I leads to nothing 
more than additional uncertainty in the business world and ren-
ders nugatory actions taken by Congress. 
As Justice Brennan accurately notes, Congress may not have 
clearly expressed its intention in dividing jurisdiction between the 
district courts and the CIT; such a lack of clarity is used by Bren-
nan to fashion an argumen.t that the Court is not in a position to 
121. See K-Mart I, 108 S. Ct. of 962. 
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accurately rewrite the statutory language. While in and of itself, 
the Court is not in a position to rewrite existing language, it does 
have an obligation to clarify the language based on existing re-
sources, prior to traipsing into its own meadow of lexicography. 
Even if the legislative history is unclear, a review of similarly 
worded and founded statutes-Le., other existing customs laws or 
jurisdictional statutes-should be examined before the Court es-
tablishes its own definition of statutory terms. The fact that two 
philosophically opposed Justices formulate two equally plausible 
"common sense" definitions of the term "embargo" indicates that 
the Court should have trod more carefully. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The upshot for the business community is a continuing confu-
sion born of the majority's view that "embargoes" are not the 
equivalent of "import prohibitions." How many more fine lines of 
definition can be drawn or redrawn in light of the great number of 
undefined terms in the § 1581(i) statute alone? Is an importer to 
presume that a tariff is not really a tariff or that a fee is not really 
a fee because the Supreme Court has determined that an embargo 
is not really an import prohibition? And what has this done to the 
jurisdiction of the CIT? All questions relating to § 1581(i) jurisdic-
tion must now undergo a more intensive and possibly tortured 
analysis in order to determine whether a case is properly before 
the CIT. District court dockets may become ever more crowded as 
businessmen are no longer willing to risk bringing suit in the CIT, 
for fear that the district courts will invoke federal question juris-
diction instead. Suits, then, covering any aspect of trade or cus-
toms law will be filed first in the district court to avoid the difficul-
ties and inherent inefficiency of having to file suit in the CIT only 
to discover later that the district court had jurisdiction. 
In addition, the Supreme Court's decision effectively estab-
lishes a concurrent jurisdiction between the CIT and the district 
courts-to be determined by how the litigants frame the issues. 
Such concurrent jurisdiction directly contradicts the exclusive ju-
risdiction Congress sought to establish in the CIT. Are these the 
true results the K-Mart I majority sought-a gutting of CIT juris-
diction, a blatant disregard for legislative intent and a return to 
the jurisdictional quagmire? If not, it is unfortunate that this is 
precisely what the Court achieved. 
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